



The coming WTO negotiations

- 13 Danish Non-Governmental Environmental and Development Organisations'
Positions and Proposals for the next round of the WTO negotiations

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About the Organizations

In the '92-Group, Danish environmental and development organisations co-operate on the following-up to UN's Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de Janeiro, 1992

The Danish North/South Coalition is a coalition of Danish development and environmental NGOs which work with trade, debt, and development.

The Coming WTO Negotiations

- Danish Non-Governmental Environmental and Development Organisations' Positions and Proposals

At the Second WTO Ministerial Conference in May 1998 it was decided to start preparations for a new round of negotiations on trade liberalisation. The final decisions regarding the initiation of a new round, including which issues will put on the negotiating agenda, will be made at the coming Ministerial Conference in November-December 1999.

In the previous round of negotiations - the Uruguay Round - sustainable development was included as one of the objectives of the then new World Trade Organisation, the WTO. Until now, this has not led to any decisive consequences: It still proves very difficult to integrate environmental concerns into WTO trade rules and regulations; issues regarding development needs of the Third World are still given very low priority, and the WTO fails to take into account the fact that trade liberalisation can have very different implications for men and women.

The Uruguay Round resulted in a few improvements for developing countries. Agreements were made which were supposed to give developing countries improved possibilities for exporting certain agricultural products as well as textiles and clothing to the developed countries. In addition, the poor, net food-importing countries were promised compensation for expected rising food prices. Unfortunately, the wealthy countries have by and large not yet met their obligations in accordance with the spirit of the Uruguay Round.

As the volume of international trade increases, the need for international regulation of social and environmental issues becomes increasingly more urgent. Trade liberalisation makes both losers and winners and implies a need for redistributive measures and policies at the international level, for instance, through special considerations and increased development assistance for those countries and population groups who lose out and become marginalised. Without a global environmental policy, unfettered trade can lead to further pressure on the earth's fragile and limited resources.

If the WTO is to live up to its own objective to contribute to sustainable development in a meaningful way, a coming round of negotiations must not focus narrowly on trade liberalisation as the prime and overall objective. Instead the focus must be on the need for increased international trade regulation in which development and environment concerns are integrated.

Danish environmental and development NGO's in the '92-Group and the Danish North/South Coalition urge the Danish government to work towards setting the advancement of sustainable development as the prime objective of a coming round of WTO negotiations and propose that Denmark should therefore seek to achieve substantial progress in the following areas:

- **Environmental considerations should be integrated into WTO rules and agreements**
- **Development concerns and poverty eradication in developing countries should be a main priority in the regulation of world trade, just as the gender perspective should be mainstreamed in trade regulation.**
- **Respect for fundamental workers' rights should be integrated into WTO agreements**
- **Regulation of the world market should be expanded to include investment and competition conditions**
- **WTO should be democratised**

In some areas the current debate in the WTO is already in a deadlock, and negotiations in a coming round are likely to be quite difficult. There is a tendency among developing countries to block the inclusion of environmental standards and workers' rights, as they suspect these issues to become new pretexts for Northern protectionism. On the other hand, the EU and the US - despite rhetoric to the contrary - in actual fact take a very aggressive stand towards the developing world by continuing to limit market access for sensitive products such as agricultural products and textiles, through empty promises of compensation, and aggressive policies towards patent protection, anti-dumping, etc.

The reluctance of developing countries to negotiate new issues like environment, workers' rights and the lack of awareness regarding the gender aspect is therefore understandable, although it is not very forward-looking.

If a coming round of negotiations is to initiate positive development and contribute to giving the objective of sustainable development genuine substance in the WTO, Denmark and the EU must seek to break the deadlock by offering substantial concessions to the developing world as a quid pro quo for including the new issues in the negotiations.

A number of concrete recommendations follow which Denmark should work for, each of which advances the aim of sustainable development. The achievement of the recommendations however should not necessarily await the conclusion of the coming round of trade liberalisation negotiations which might go on for years. The possibilities for obtaining progress before the conclusion of the round should be detected and utilised.

1.Environment

There has not been any appreciable progress in the environmental field since the establishment of WTO in 1995. It is for instance still not clarified whether the WTO can be misused to set aside some trade restrictions which are used in international environmental conventions such as the Montreal Protocol, the Basle Convention, and CITES.

It is also unclear to what extent the WTO-agreements limit possibilities to introduce regional or national environment regulations that have consequences for imported products. In the WTO a number of disputes concerning national environment rules have been settled; and each time the result has been that the regulations have been set aside.

Environmental arguments should not be used to introduce disguised trade restrictions, so called "green protectionism"; but on the other hand, considerations for free trade should not be given precedence over environmental considerations.

Denmark should continue to work for the adoption of binding international rules in the environmental field and the use of trade restrictions as part of such rules. The rules should, as the point of departure, be minimum rules and contain an environmental guarantee which allows the individual country to give more extensive considerations towards the environment.

Denmark should furthermore work for the limitation of the use of restrictions on imported goods from developing countries due to environmental problems connected to the production process methods in the country of origin. Restrictions should be applied to developing countries, only when other solutions (assistance, transfer of technology, international agreements, etc.) are not sufficiently effective. When applying trade restrictions to goods from developing countries, mainly positive incentives (such as environment labelling and increased market access for products with less environmental impact) should be used instead of negative sanctions (such as duties and embargo). In the WTO Denmark should work for:

1.1 Clear rules in WTO agreements allowing trade restrictions to be used in international environmental conventions and trade sanctions to be introduced towards countries who are not respecting international environmental conventions.

1.2 Specifications in WTO-agreements that nation states and regional governmental organisations can implement any well-founded environmental regulations - also regulations based on the precautionary principle -

if at least the same demands to domestic goods and services are placed on imported goods and services, and if the rules are in agreement with potentially binding international environmental agreements in the area.

1.3 Provision of environmental expertise and knowledge to the WTO-panels and appeal institutions that settle disputes concerning environmental regulation.

The coming round of trade liberalisation negotiations should be structured so progress in the field of environmental does not necessarily have to await the conclusion of the entire round. As such it would be appropriate to clarify the basis of the rules as soon as possible, since there are a number of disputes being processed in WTO concerning environmental rules and more disputes should be expected in the following years.

The elimination of trade restrictions can have both positive and negative consequences for the environment. The environmental aspect should therefore be integrated in the coming round, and analyses of the consequences of trade liberalisation for sustainable development should be undertaken before the agreements go into effect (see proposal 2.1 below). Denmark should work energetically for the inclusion of sectors in the coming round of negotiations which could result in progress for the environment. Denmark should therefore work for:

1.4 New agreements on reduction of environmentally damaging subsidies in for example the energy, fishing, and agriculture sectors. (see also section 4. Agriculture.)

1.5 Attainment of rapid results in regards to liberalisation of trade in environmental products (for ex. organic goods and sustainably produced tropical wood) and in environmental technology.

2. Development, Poverty Eradication and the Gender Aspect

The WTO is well on the way to becoming a global trade organisation. 134 countries are members of the organisation; and a number of countries, including China and Russia, have requested membership.

This should lead to the regulation of the world trade in a manner which is beneficial for the entire world's population and not just for inhabitants of the rich countries. Observers rightly noted that the Uruguay Round was the "rich countries' round". That must not be repeated. Denmark should work for setting the problems of the poor in central focus in the coming round.

Women and girls compose 70% of the world's poor. That is one of the reasons that it is essential to integrate the gender aspect into world trade rules and analysis. Denmark should together with other efforts work for:

2.1 Implementation of impact analyses of the consequences of trade liberalisation for sustainable development, including the consequences for women and children. The analyses should be carried out before trade agreements are initiated and in connection with the WTO's regular trade policy reviews of the member countries.

2.2 Introduction of mechanisms with the purpose of giving full compensation to the poor countries for negative effects of future trade liberalisation. The compensation must not be deducted from assistance to developing countries.

2.3 Least developed countries' free access (i.e. no duties or quotas) to the markets of the rich countries.

2.4 Reduction of tariff rates by rich countries on goods from the developing countries, including agricultural goods (see also section 4. Agriculture), fish and fish products as well as leather goods, textiles and clothing. In addition, it must be ensured that no deterioration in the Agreement on Clothes and Textiles is allowed. This involves among other things that all types of quotas on these goods shall be phased out before 2005.

2.5 Liquidation of tax escalation, i.e. the practice that rich countries employ where tariff rates are higher for manufactured goods than for raw materials.

2.6 Agreements on the liberalisation of trade in services which are of special importance to developing countries.

2.7 WTO acceptance of trade agreements like the Lomé Agreement, i.e. agreements in which industrialised countries give a group of developing countries improved market access without requiring reciprocal free access to the markets of the developing countries in question.

2.8 Limitation of the possibilities for rich countries to misuse anti-dumping rules. Anti-dumping instruments should be limited to situations involving market dominance and should be included in the WTO's normal dispute settlement system.

2.9 Obligating the WTO to build up gender competence in producing gender specific analyses, including impact analyses of how changes in trade policy affect women's and men's occupational access, employment, income, control of and access to resources, etc.

3. Workers' Rights

There is a risk that increased free trade will lead to environmental and social dumping: that production will be placed in countries with the lowest level of environmental regulation and the least protection of workers. And that can lead to a pressure for deterioration of standards in other countries.

A comprehensive documentation exists on how workers' rights are violated in a large number of countries; and it is worrying that competition for jobs among developing countries is leading to the creation of an increasing number of export production zones, where even the most basic workers' rights are violated. A large part of the employed in these production processing zones are women and children.

Sustainable development can not be achieved in a climate of poverty and oppression of workers; far from it: sustainable development means that development takes place for the world's poorest.

It is internationally agreed that there are seven conventions from UN's workers' organisation, ILO, which comprise the cornerstone of human rights at the work place. They also received this classification in the agreements from UN's Social Summit in Copenhagen 1995; and as such they should be integrated into WTO rules.

It is the ILO-conventions no. 138 (right to childhood), 29 and 105 (rights to freedom from slavery and forced labour), 87 and 98 (the right to choose membership of a labour union and the right to collective organisation) as well as 100 and 111 (rights to freedom from discrimination on the basis of sex, race, colour, religion, political viewpoints, nationality or ethnic origin).

The demand for the respect of workers' rights should not be a blind for protectionism; but on the other hand, it should be secured that free trade does not lead to a "race to the bottom".

This should together with other efforts be ensured by:

3.1 The obligation of WTO member countries to respect basic worker rights, as well as the introduction of the possibility of applying sanctions when violations of these rights are demonstrated.

3.2 The inclusion of worker rights concerns in the regular WTO trade policy reviews of member countries.

4. Agriculture

The agricultural support systems of the EU and other industrialised countries lead to intensive agricultural production systems, resulting in great damages to the environment. In addition, the subsidy systems lead to massive distortions in the international markets for food and agricultural products.

Disposal of surplus production with export subsidies results in unfair competition for many Third World producers; and internal support measures in wealthy countries lead to artificially low prices on world markets. Governments in developing countries are therefore often tempted to rely on importing cheap food products from abroad instead of developing their own potential for food production.

The present Agreement of Agriculture under the WTO limits the extent of these distortions by defining ceilings on the export subsidies allowed, by limiting the domestic support for agricultural products, and through demanding a minimum market access for agricultural products, so that imports of 5% of the national consumption of a given product should be allowed.

However, many developing countries have already opened their markets much more than the European Union, not as a result of WTO commitments, but as part of economic reform programs, structural adjustment programmes which contained conditionalities on market opening defined by the World Bank or the International Monetary Fund.

It is definitely a risk that the coming negotiations in the multilateral trading system, in the efforts to promote free trade and limit protectionism in agriculture, now will prevent developing countries from protecting their food markets and developing their own agricultural potentials by disallowing the support measures which enabled, for instance, the EU to develop from a net importer to a net food-exporter.

With its high profile on development issues, the Danish government should work hard to ensure that a renegotiated Agreement of Agriculture will allow developing countries greater space for furthering food security through developing and protecting their own agricultural production. This should be furthered through the following steps:

4.1 Developing countries must be excepted from minimum market access obligations for food/agricultural products, especially regarding basic food items

4.2 Developing countries must be allowed greater space for developing their own agriculture and food security, for instance by allowing them to use domestic support measures which developed countries have to phase out.

In addition, a new Agreement on Agriculture should aim at a more fair competition and less market distortions. Denmark should therefore seek to ensure:

4.3 A speedy phasing out of export subsidies, both through lower ceilings of the total amounts of support allowed and through limitations on how export subsidies can be targeted to specific markets (for instance by introducing limits to the extent of the subsidy compared to the price the good will earn on the export market).

4.4 Further reductions in the domestic support levels allowed, including much stricter criteria for the exemption of so called decoupled support measures: The present area and headage premiums of the EU, which is linked to historical yield and size of herds, should not be exempted from reduction demands

4.5 Continued WTO allowance of support for environmental conservation, organic farming and other ways of advancing extensive agricultural production without restrictions. The area should however be monitored closely in order to avoid that these forms of support will lead to unfair competition towards Third World producers.

4.6 Increased access to EU markets for developing countries in general, also for products covered by the Common Agricultural Policy. The first step should be to offer least developed countries free market access.

When export subsidies and the level of domestic support are reduced, the price level for certain agricultural products can be expected to increase. In the short run, this can harm developing countries dependent on food import (net food-importing countries).

It is therefore important to maintain and renew the promise from the Marrakech Agreement in 1994 to compensate these countries for possible negative effects of the Agreement of Agriculture. Until now this promise has not been fulfilled.

Denmark should ensure:

4.7 That net-food importing countries are compensated for the increasing levels of prices resulting from the present Agreement of Agriculture. This compensation must not be deducted from the normal development assistance.

4.8 That a new Agreement of Agriculture should include obligations to provide support for agricultural development in net food-importing countries in order to prevent possible negative effects. In addition, compensation should be provided for the increase in prices that the new agreement may cause.

5. Intellectual Property Rights

Intellectual property rights are regulated through the so-called TRIPS Agreement (Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights) under the auspices of WTO. According to the agreement, member countries must implement patent protection on areas which are not yet included in national jurisdiction. The industrialised countries had a deadline to implement this protection before 1996, while the developing countries have a deadline in 2000, and the least developed countries have deadline in 2005.

The TRIPS Agreement regulates, among other items, copyrights, industrial designs, trade marks, patents, and protection of plant varieties. This is an area in which the majority of developing countries have not even produced legislation yet. They have to develop an extensive set of laws and an administration for these laws first. Very few developing countries have the capacity and economic resources to carry this out within the agreed deadline.

According to the TRIPS Agreement, article 27.3(b), the countries are not committed to grant protection of patents on plants and animals. But they are committed to grant protection to plant varieties. That can happen either by the introduction of a patent system along the lines of the Western model or by the introduction of other, so-called "sui generis - systems".

During the coming round of negotiations in WTO, it can be expected that developing countries will experience increased pressure to extend article 27.3(b) to include more than it does today or to completely remove the article, so nothing can be from patenting in the future.

The USA has already announced that it will work for the removal of the sui generis-systems. If this is the case, this will enable the biotechnological industry to take out patents on all kinds of genetic material without consideration for developing countries or indigenous people. This is contrary to the objectives of Danish development policy.

Denmark should therefore work for:

5.1 A less restrictive TRIPS Agreement with shorter periods of patent protection and the exemption of least developed countries from the agreement.

5.2 Further extension of the deadline for the introduction of sui-generis systems and the provision of support for developing countries that do not have sufficient capacity to develop such systems.

5.3 Retaining the TRIP Agreement, article 27.3(b) in its present form, so member countries can still refrain from patenting living organisms such as plants and animals.

5.4 Ensuring farmers' rights to their land, seed, etc. by recognising "farmers rights" in the TRIPs Agreement.

5.5 Securing the rights of indigenous peoples to their own resources by giving the Biodiversity Convention precedence over the TRIPs Agreement.

5.6 Implementation of rules on compensation to developing countries in connection with patenting or other commercial exploitation of their genetic resources.

6. Investments

Investments across borders have since the middle of the 1980's received a markedly increasing importance in the world economy. Whereas trade between countries previously played the biggest role in supplying foreign markets with goods and services, this dominant role is now furnished through foreign direct investments.

The rights of the investor are typically secured by the signing of a bilateral investment agreement between the investor's country of origin and the receiving country. International co-operation in the investment field can be improved and eased by entering a multilateral agreement on investments in order to replace the numerous bilateral agreements. At the same time such an agreement will juridically give nations with weak and strong economies equal rights.

Along with the rapid increase in foreign investments, a steep transnationalisation of private companies has taken place. The implementation of a regulation of transnational companies and their international investments has thereby become very urgent. A multilateral agreement on investments must therefore not just involve the rights of the investors, but also their responsibilities and obligations.

In a multilateral agreement on investments special considerations should be given to developing countries. Developing countries should be allowed to make special demands to the concrete designing of the investments, in order to develop their national economies and secure special considerations for poor segments of the population and women. This might be demands for employing local workforce, reinvestment of profits, and partial national ownership of the investment. Furthermore, developing countries should be able to regulate the transfers of capital from foreign countries, and thereby have an opportunity to intervene in cases of speculation and deficit on the balance of payments.

In principle, the UN-system with its broader and more democratic composition would be the ideal framework for the negotiation of a multilateral agreement on investments. However, realistically, the negotiations should take place and an agreement be made under the auspices of WTO. This is partly due to the fact that WTO is the most important organisation for international co-operation in the macro-economic area, and partly because the WTO operates with binding rules, a dispute settlement system, and possibilities for sanctions.

In other words, Denmark should work for including negotiations on a multilateral agreement on investments in the coming WTO round. However, just any multilateral investment agreement at all is not preferred to no agreement. The content of the agreement is extremely important. What is needed is a multilateral agreement on investments secures democratic regulation of investments internationally and promotes a global sustainable development. The demands to such an agreement should be the following:

6.1 Investors have responsibility to respect the ILO conventions covering basic workers' rights and the OECD guidelines for transnational companies.

6.2 Investors are obligated to observe the UN Human Rights Declaration with the corresponding conventions as well as the international environmental conventions.

6.3 The extension of the basic WTO principle, national treatment, to prohibit the preferential treatment of foreign investors which today often results in the neglect of rules concerning environmental and employee protection, for ex. in export production processing zones.

6.4 The implementation of environmental and social impact assessments and hearings of the local populations before the placement of new, big production sites, etc.

6.5 The agreement will not make it more difficult to implement the usual national regulation, such as regulation concerning physical planning, the environment, the work place environment, consumer protection, tax and cultural policies.

6.6 The possibility for developing countries to make special demands to investments, for ex. demands to hire a local work force, to reinvest profits, and partial national ownership of the investment.

6.7 The possibility for developing countries to regulate the transfer of capital abroad.

6.8 The agreement does not hinder the implementation of agreements in other fora which impede currency speculation, for ex. by hindering or limiting short-term capital flows.

6.9 Dispute settlement process continues to take place between states as it does in the current WTO system, supplemented with a greater openness and transparency in the process.

6.10 The agreement pertains only to areas and sectors explicitly mentioned in the agreement.

6.11 The possibility for individual countries to decide which areas and sectors the agreement shall cover.

7. Competition

At present there are no binding and effective rules on the international level that prevent the establishment of monopolies and practices that distort the competition, such as price dumping, exclusion of competitors, and the export of profits through foreign concerns' internal accounting systems.

There are WTO rules on anti-dumping, but they are insufficient. The anti-dumping rules favour national companies and as such they are in effect an obstacle to competition.

Under WTO-auspices there is also an agreement on public procurement. The agreement provides better possibilities for competition because it stipulates that foreign and domestic suppliers should have equal treatment. However, so far only 25 countries have signed on to the agreement, and many goods and services are exempted.

Binding international regulation of competition would be beneficial for developing countries. Such rules would lead to the opening of industrialised countries' markets to imported goods from developing countries; and the rules would limit the at times ruthless behaviour of multinational companies.

International competition rules should however give special consideration to food security as well to agricultural and industrial development in developing countries by allowing protection of especially vulnerable sectors in these countries against foreign competition.

In other words Denmark should work for the adoption of a WTO agreement on the regulation of competition policy which gives specific consideration to the developing countries' situation. Denmark should furthermore work for:

7.1 Prohibition of practises that distort competition.

7.2 Protection of particularly vulnerable sectors in developing countries against foreign competition.

See in addition proposal 1.4 concerning subsidies, 2.8 concerning anti-dumping and 4.1 to 4.5 concerning agricultural subsidies.

8. The Democratising of WTO

Historically, the trade liberalisation negotiations in GATT have been marked by secretiveness, and this tradition has continued in WTO. But in the course of including a larger number of products and wider range of problems in the WTO agreements, it has now become more necessary to involve politicians and populations in the decision-making processes.

The WTO Secretariat has more recently actively begun to inform the outside world on what is going on in WTO. But the main WTO rule is still that all documents are restricted until the case in question is closed. This applies among other things to agendas, proposals for decisions, background notes, and meeting minutes.

A few types of documents are automatically publicised after a certain period. The rest of the documents are only publicised, if there are no countries that object to the publication.

Ensuring transparency in the WTO is important. Most kinds of meeting papers should be available before the decisions are made. Otherwise it will still only be the persons and organisations with the best contacts which are able to influence decisions. In practice it will probably primarily mean American and European industrial and agricultural organisations as well as the transnational companies.

The secretiveness furthermore results in the lack of independent, critical examination of data and analyses upon which the negotiations are based. Denmark should work for:

8.1 The publication of provisional agendas well in advance of meetings.

8.2 The de-restriction of proposals from member countries and background notes from the WTO-secretariat, as soon as they are officially submitted. In more narrowly defined cases of exceptions, such documents can be kept restricted for a short period.

8.3 The submission of written contributions by NGOs to meetings in the WTO.

8.4 The participation of NGO-representatives in certain parts of WTO meetings.

8.5 The inclusion in the minutes of information about national positions that members have stated, and the de-restriction of minutes as soon as they are approved.

8.6 The de-restriction of conclusions from WTO-panels and organs of appeal as soon as they are formulated.

8.7 The convening of regular information meetings between NGOs and chairpersons or other government representatives from WTO councils and committees.

8.8 The obligation of the WTO Secretariat to inform Third World NGOs, including the establishment of information channels for NGOs without access to the internet, and provision of courses for NGO from the Third World.

8.9 The involvement of national parliaments in the work of the WTO, for ex. through the establishment of a parliamentary assembly in connection with the WTOs ministerial conferences.

In 1998 negotiations started on the revision of WTO's rules on the confidentiality and publication of documents; but these negotiations have not so far produced any results. If no substantial progress in the area is reached before the next round of negotiations, this subject should be included in the coming round. However, this should be done in such a manner that progress in transparency and democratisation does not necessarily have to await the conclusion of the whole round.

Even though every member country has one vote in the WTO, reality is that the few rich countries have the decisive influence. Because of their economic strength, EU, USA, and Japan are the central players.

The uneven distribution of power is also due to the fact that many negotiations in reality take place in informal fora. Many developing countries do not have the possibility to participate, partly because they are not informed about the informal negotiations and non-papers, and partly because they do not have the resources to participate, even if they know about the meetings.

In general it is a problem that very few developing countries possess the expertise needed to analyse the consequences of proposals which are presented in WTO, just as they lack the expertise necessary to utilise the WTO's dispute settlement system effectively.

More formalisation of processes and openness in negotiations and voting can contribute to giving developing countries more influence in WTO.

It will also contribute to the involvement of politicians, the press, and the populations in the decisions in the rich as well as in the poor countries.

Denmark should work for:

8.10 That negotiations as far as possible take place under the formalised auspices, and that the results of meetings and negotiations under informal auspices are de-restricted for other countries.

8.11 That financial support to improve better representation at the WTO is given to the poorest developing countries or groups from these.

8.12 That the possibilities for the developing countries to use WTO's dispute settlement system are improved by providing access to qualified advice.

8.13 That the rich countries are required to pay the case costs for both parties, when they lose WTO lawsuits to developing countries.

About this publication

The following organisations support the presented views and proposals, although not each individual organisation necessarily agrees with every detail. The member organisations are very diverse; and not all of them have an opinion about everything that is mentioned in the paper. Subsequently some of the organisations will have additions and further proposals that they will seek to promote themselves.

BirdLife Denmark
DanChurchAid
Danish Association for International Co-operation
Danish United Nations Association
FairNet
Greenpeace Denmark
IBIS
K.U.L.U. - Women and Development

Nepenthes
The Danish Society for the Conservation of Nature
The Ecological Council
The Labour Movement's International Forum
WWF Denmark

This publication was published in March 1999. The publication is the result of a co-operation between organisations which are members of the '92-Group or the Danish North/South Coalition. In the '92-Group, Danish environmental and development organisations co-operate on the following-up to UN's Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de Janeiro, 1992. The Danish North/South Coalition is a coalition of Danish development and environmental NGOs which work with trade, debt, and development.

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